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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FRANK MADRID, : Case No. 981404-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT CHALLENGING THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The State asserts in its brief ("S.B.") that Frank Madrid's 
("Madrid") trial counsel was not ineffective although he failed to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Hovater, 
914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (setting forth 
analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel);see also 
Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at Point I (providing analysis of 
Madrid's ineffective assistance argument). In support of its 
argument on appeal, the State, in part, contends that Madrid 
"relies upon incorrect law . . . [in citing] State v. Hill, 727 
P.2d 221 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that when only 
circumstantial evidence is presented, the 'evidence supporting a 
conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence.'" S.B. at 12 (citing A.B.13; (quoting Hill, 727 P.2d at 
222) .2 
1
 With regard to Madrid's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, Madrid submits on his opening brief in response to 
points made in the State's brief which are not specifically 
addressed in this reply brief. See A.B. Point I. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, however, the Hill analysis 
cited by Madrid, see A.B. 12-13, is not "incorrect law". S.B. 12. 
Rather, Hill provides the correct analytical framework for 
assessing the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented 
at trial below. In making its argument, the State cites to State 
v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998) and State v. Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied 913 P.2d 7491 
(Utah 1996), which provide that "'[t]he existence of one or more 
alternate reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the 
jury from concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.1" Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 (quoting Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 
695) . 
A close reading of Blubaugh, the legal basis of Lyman, reveals 
that Hill is consistent with their holdings. Although Blubaugh 
states that circumstantial evidence need not preclude every and any 
conceivable theory of innocence, it still requires that such 
evidence preclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence. 904 P.2d at 
694-95. Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Tanner, 
675 P. 2d 53 9 (Utah 1983) and an opinion from the Texas Court of 
Appeals, Huerta v. State, 635 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), the 
Blubaugh Court explained that "''[t]he rules of circumstantial 
evidence do not require that the circumstances should to a moral 
certainty actually exclude every hypothesis that the act may have 
been committed by another person, but the hypothesis intended is a 
reasonable one consistent with the circumstances and facts 
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proved.''" 904 P.2d at 695 (quoting Tanner, 675 P.2d at 550-51 
(quoting Huerta, 635 S.W.2d at 851)). 
In an earlier opinion, the Supreme Court in Tanner reinforced 
the need to preclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence, as opposed 
to any and every conceivable hypotheses of innocence. 
"To sustain a verdict based on circumstantial evidence, 
it is not necessary that such evidence exclude every 
possible doubt or theoretical supposition in no way 
related to the facts or circumstances of the case. It is 
enough that such evidence exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence." 
675 P. 2d at 551 (emphasis added) (quoting Aldridcre v. Mississippi, 
398 So.2d 1308, 1311 (Miss. 1981)). 
Hence, contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, the Hill 
analysis has not been superceded by this Court's opinions in 
Blubauah and Lyman. Indeed, Hill, which likewise provides that 
circumstantial evidence must preclude reasonable hypotheses of 
innocence, 727 P.2d at 222, is consistent with the authority cited 
by the State. Hill is, therefore, the correct analytical framework 
for assessing the viability of a claim of insufficient evidence in 
this case and, in turn, whether Madrid's counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to make such a challenge before 
the trial court. See A.B. Point I. 
To the extent that the circumstantial evidence in this case 
failed to preclude the reasonable hypothesis of Madrid's innocence, 
Hill, Blubauah, and Lyman instruct that Madrid's convictions for 
burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) , and attempted theft, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-101 (1995), fail for 
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insufficient evidence. Hence, Madrid's trial counsel did not 
render effective assistance where he failed to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence. See A.B. Point I. 
Specifically, as discussed in Madrid's opening brief, the 
circumstantial evidence presented below (the State did not present 
any direct evidence substantiating the allegations against Madrid), 
did not sufficiently foreclose the defense theory that Madrid was 
unaware of, nor in any measure an accomplice to, the burglary and 
attempted theft of the Paddock/Reeves home. See A.B. 12-18. 
In addition, and contrary to the State's contention on appeal, 
case law discussing the sufficiency of the evidence in similar 
scenarios demonstrates the viability of a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence in this case and, hence, defense 
counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to raise the challenge below. 
The State challenges Madrid's reliance upon the facts of Hill, 727 
P.2d 221, and State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987), two cases 
wherein convictions were overturned for insufficient circumstantial 
evidence. S.B. 13-15. The State argues in particular that Madrid 
is "tied more closely to the crime" than the defendants in Hill and 
Kalisz, noting that Madrid was parked in "Paddock's [parking] 
spot"; that defendant was near the burgled home, acting "presumably 
the lookout"; that defendant acted "in a suspicious manner" and 
then "left hurriedly with his unidentified co-perpetrator." S.B. 
14-15. 
In fact, the defendants in Hill and Kalisz bore as many, if 
not more, ties to the respective crimes than Madrid has with the 
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burglary and attempted theft of the Paddock/Reeves home. For 
example, in Hill, the defendant was placed at the scene of the 
crime, an antiques store, the day before the crime occurred and 
evidence established that he actually showed interest in the stolen 
items later found in his possession. 727 P. 2d at 222. A statement 
of one other person, read into evidence by a testifying officer, 
also indicated that the defendant and another party conspired to 
take the items from the antiques store. Id. 
Madrid, unlike the defendant in Hill, was not placed at the 
crime scene. He was in his own neighborhood, walking on the public 
sidewalk alongside the Paddock/Reeves house. R.110 [127,161] . 
Moreover, there was no accomplice testimony linking Madrid to the 
crime; the other man seen jumping the fence was never identified or 
apprehended. R.100. Additionally, Madrid was not parked in 
"Paddock's parking spot" as the State suggests, S.B.14, for the 
evidence in no way suggests that there were assigned parking stalls 
in the residential neighborhood. Rather, the evidence shows that 
Madrid was parked legally on a city street in a place where, 
according to Paddock, he habitually parked. R.110 [125]. In 
addition, Madrid had legitimate business in the neighborhood --he 
was looking at a van that was down the street from the 
Paddock/Reeves home, and Madrid himself lived in the area. 
R.110 [127,161] . The defendant in Hill, by contrast, had a more 
suspect connection to the crime scene insofar as he had no other 
business with the antiques shop other than looking at certain items 
that were for sale there and that were later found in his 
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possession. See 727 P.2d at 222. 
The State likewise argues that Madrid's reliance on Kalisz is 
misplaced because, according to the State, the facts of Madrid's 
case more "strong[ly]" suggest guilt. S.B.15. However, the facts 
of the Kalisz case, where the Supreme Court overturned the 
defendant's aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient 
circumstantial evidence, actually parallel those of Madrid's case. 
Hence, Kalisz indicates that Madrid's defense counsel could have 
made a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and 
was ineffective for failing to do so. 
Similar to the present case, the defendant in Kalisz was 
placed in a car with another party within hours of an aggravated 
robbery for which the other party was later apprehended. 73 5 P. 2d 
at 61. Moreover, like Kalisz, incriminating evidence was not found 
on Madrid's person or in his possession. Id. If anything, the 
circumstances of Madrid's case are less compelling than those 
present in Kalisz because the defendant in Kalisz falsely reported 
to investigating officers that he took the person who committed the 
robbery to the hospital, a claim which could be construed by a jury 
as an attempt to cover his own involvement in the crime and explain 
away his suspicious affiliation with the perpetrator. Id. The 
evidence here does not suggest that Madrid ever made such a 
patently false and misleading claim to investigating officers in 
this case. 
In short, the State's assertion that Madrid has closer ties 
with the burglary and attempted theft than the defendants in Hill 
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and Kalisz had with the respective crimes in those cases is 
unfounded. In reality, Hill and Kalisz reinforce the viability of 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence insofar as the 
defendants in those cases had the same sort of connections with the 
crimes of which they were later acquitted on appeal. Indeed, in 
many respects, the evidence against those defendants was arguably 
more suspect than the evidence presented against Madrid. Yet, the 
Hill and Kalisz Courts held that the circumstantial evidence was 
not strong enough to support the jury convictions in those cases. 
See Hill, 727 P.2d at 223; Kalisz, 735 P.2d at 61. Where the 
evidence against Madrid was not as compelling as that in Hill and 
Kalisz, the viability of a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence is established. In turn, defense counsel's failure to 
raise the issue below constitutes ineffective assistance. See A.B. 
Point I. 
The State further cites State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 
1984), State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), and State v. 
McCullar, 674 P.2d 117 (Utah 1983) to bolster its position that 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence in Madrid's case. S.B.15-16. The 
State particularly notes these cases for the proposition that a 
defendant need not be directly placed at the scene of a crime in 
order to sustain a conviction against a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Id. 
However, the cases cited by the State are distinguishable from 
the circumstances of the case at bar. For instance, Bingham is 
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distinguishable because the defendant in that case was seen on the 
premises of the burgled home, albeit not in the home itself, 
running down the driveway with a stolen camera in his hand. 6 84 
P. 2d at 44. Madrid, on the other hand, was not spotted on the 
premises of the Paddock/Reeve's home, nor "running" away, Bingham, 
684 P. 2d at 44, as if to escape detection as the defendant in 
Bingham was doing. R.110[127-28]. Moreover, the evidence does not 
establish that Madrid had any incriminating evidence in hand, id., 
like the stolen camera that Bingham held as he ran down the 
driveway. 684 P.2d at 44. Indeed, Madrid was walking toward the 
Paddock/Reeve's home when he was noticed by Paddock on the 
sidewalk. R.110[127]. Hence, unlike the defendant in Bingham, 
Madrid was not acting in the sort of suspiciously elusive manner 
that would "permit [] the inference," Bingham, 684 P. 2d at 46, that 
he was involved in the burglary and attempted theft at issue here. 
McCullar is similarly distinctive from the present case. In 
McCullar, the evidence against the defendant consisted primarily of 
the testimony of two accomplices, which established that the 
defendant was one of two men who broke into the victims' home and 
took several items from the victims' at gunpoint. 674 P. 2d at 118. 
The victims' testimony further corroborated the accomplice 
testimony insofar as they testified that two unidentifiable men 
broke into their home, one of them with a gun, bound the victims 
with duct tape and tipped a couch on top of them. Id. The victims 
further testified that the men then took several valuables from the 
home. Id. 
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Unlike McCullar, the evidence against Madrid does not consist 
of any such accomplice testimony implicating Madrid in the burglary 
and attempted theft at issue here. R.110. In fact, the man seen 
jumping the fence was never identified or apprehended and therefore 
was not available to testify at Madrid's trial. Id. Additionally, 
Paddock, the victim in this case, could not offer the same sort of 
detailed testimony that the victims in McCullar offered, indicating 
with the sort of certainty that there were two people involved in 
the burglary and attempted theft of his home. Rather, Paddock 
could only state that he saw Madrid walking along the sidewalk 
around the time he saw the other man jump the fence, that Madrid 
seemed in a panic when confronted by Paddock, and that Madrid and 
the other person drove off in the same car moments later. 
R.110 [127-28] . Hence, Paddock's testimony about Madrid's 
connection to the crime not definitive about the involvement of two 
people, let alone conclusive about Madrid's alleged participation, 
and therefore distinguishable from the evidence in McCullar. 
Finally, Ellis is similarly distinguishable from the case at 
bar. In Ellis, the defendant was caught in a car with another man 
driving slowly, then accelerating, past the scene of a burglary. 
748 P. 2d at 189. Madrid, by contrast, was not behaving in the same 
suspect manner as the defendant in Ellis until he met Paddock. 
R.110 [127-28] . Specifically, Madrid was walking toward his car 
when he happened to meet Paddock on the sidewalk. Id. It was not 
until Paddock asked him in an accusatory manner why he was in the 
yard that his demeanor changed to what Paddock described as 
9 
"panicky.." Id. Simultaneously, the other man was jumping the 
fence and running toward Madrid's car, a fact that must have 
alarmed Madrid even further and clued him into the fact that the 
other person was probably involved in criminal activity. 
R.110 [126] . Hence, Madrid himself stepped up his pace to reach his 
car. R. 110 [128,130] ; see also A.B.22-24 (discussing case law that 
states a suspects act of avoiding confrontation does not support 
inference in the similar context of a "reasonable suspicion" 
analysis). 
In sum, the facts of Blubaugh, McCullar, and Ellis are 
stronger indications of guilt than the facts present in the case at 
bar. Hence, the inference that the defendants in those cases were 
guilty of the respective crimes alleged, despite the fact that none 
of them were directly placed at the scene of the crime, was more 
reasonable than the jury's guilty verdict in this case. 
In light of the foregoing, defense counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence in Madrid's case. Such a challenge was not only 
viable, as demonstrated by other case law, but "there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different." Hovater, 914 P.2d at 3 9 (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694) . 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS SUBMISSION OF THE FLIGHT 
INSTRUCTION AMOUNTS TO PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The State contends on appeal that the trial court's submission 
of the flight instruction is supported by the evidence and, in any 
event, does not amount to prejudicial error requiring reversal in 
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this case. S.B. Point II. Madrid submits on his opening brief in 
support of his argument that the flight instruction is not 
supported by the evidence. See A. B. 20-25. In response to the 
State's harmless error analysis, Madrid makes the following points: 
The State primarily asserts that the instruction was 
"prejudice-proofed" insofar as it admonished the jury that it could 
infer guilt from flight only if the evidence supported such an 
inference. S.B.20; see also Addendum A (flight instruction no. 
24) . In support of its argument, the State cites four out-of-state 
cases which held that the giving of similar flight instructions did 
not merit reversal because they, too, admonished the jury that 
flight supported an inference of guilt only to the extent that the 
evidence established flight. S.B.20-21 (citing Leverett v. State, 
333 S.E.2d 609, 610 (Ga. 1985); Commonwealth v. Brown,, 605 N.E.2d 
837, 839 (Mass. 1993); State v. Abraham, 451 S.E.2d 131. 157 (N.C. 
1994); State v. Cooke, 479 A.2d 727, 733 (R.I. 1984)). 
Utah case law is silent on the mitigating effect such an 
admonition to the jury has on the prejudice effected by an 
erroneous flight instruction. Instead, as discussed in Madrid's 
opening brief, Utah law states only that an erroneous submission of 
a flight instruction may be harmless where the evidence against the 
defendant is otherwise strong. See A.B.26; State v. Bales, 675 
P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) (finding erroneous submission of flight 
instruction to be harmless where evidence provided "ample basis for 
conviction"). 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that an admonition to 
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the jury regarding the need for evidentiary support of flight does 
mitigate harm in this jurisdiction, the cases noted by the State, 
but for one, instruct that such an admonition renders the error 
harmless only where the evidence is otherwise strong. In and of 
itself, such an admonition does not cure prejudice. 
For example, in Leverett, the evidence strongly supported the 
flight instruction. 333 S.E.2d at 610. The defendant was seen 
running down the street after shooting his victim. Id. A few 
moments later, the defendant encountered a police officer and 
shouted, " [c] ome on and lock me up. I . . . shot [two persons] . " 
Id. 
Likewise in Abraham, the North Carolina Supreme Court held 
that the contested flight instruction was supported in the 
evidence. 451 S.E.2d at 157. In that case, the defendants were 
seen by police walking away from the murder scene shortly after the 
shooting occurred. Id. at 156. As police approached the 
defendants, they took a detour across a parking lot. Id. Upon an 
officer's inquiry, the two defendants dubiously denied hearing any 
gunfire and continued to walk away. Id. Lastly, one of the 
defendant's was apprehended three weeks later in an apartment, 
hiding in a closet under a pile of clothes. Id. at 156-57. 
Similarly in Cooke, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held 
that the evidence justified the flight instruction. 479 A. 2d at 
733. The Court noted that the defendant, charged with arson, left 
the crime scene immediately after the fire started. Id. The Court 
further noted that defendant could not be found by his family for 
12 
ninety minutes thereafter. Id.2 
Interestingly, the Cooke Court instructed that, in the future, 
trial courts were to include the four specific factors in their 
flight instructions to ensure that juries properly viewed and did 
not misuse flight evidence, as well as to minimize the risk of 
prejudice to defendants. Id. at 733. Those factors included the 
following four inferences: 1) that something that the defendant did 
led him to flee; 2) that the defendant fled out of a consciousness 
of guilt; 3) that defendant's consciousness of guilt derived from 
consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; 4) and that 
the defendant's consciousness of guilt regarding the crime charged 
reflects actual guilt for that crime. Id. (citing U.S. v. Meyers, 
550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
These four inferences recommended by the Cooke Court are 
identical in substance to the four factors outlined in Madrid's 
opening brief in his discussion of the lack of the evidentiary 
support for the flight instruction erroneously submitted in this 
case. See A.B.22 (citing U.S. v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th 
Cir. 1993), cert, denied 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d 
569 (1994) (other citations omitted). However, these four factors 
were not outlined for the jury in the trial court's instruction, 
2
 But see Brown, 605 N.E.2d at 839. The Brown Court held 
that the submission of the contested flight instruction was error 
because it was not supported in evidence. Id. The Court 
nonetheless held that such error was not prejudicial because the 
jury was instructed that defendant's act of leaving the crime 
scene might nonetheless support an inference of guilt in general, 
and that it was the jury's prerogative to weigh such evidence. 
Id. 
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see Addendum A (flight instruction), which further undermines its 
efficacy in ensuring that the jury properly assessed the evidence 
as it related to flight in this case. In turn, the lack of these 
guidelines in the "flight instruction compounds the prejudicial 
effect it had upon the jury's deliberations and its guilty 
verdict.3 
In short, Leverett, Abraham, and Cooke actually instruct that 
an admonition to the jury is a factor in mitigation of harm only 
where the evidence otherwise strongly supports the flight 
instruction. In cases such as Madrid's, where the evidence of his 
flight, and indeed his guilt, is ambiguous, see Bales, 675 P.2d at 
576 (instructing that erroneous admission of flight instruction is 
prejudicial where evidence of guilt is ambiguous), the fact that 
the instruction admonished the jury does not lessen its prejudicial 
effect. See A.B. Point II (explaining how evidence fails to 
justify flight instruction in particular, the ambiguity of the 
evidence going to Madrid's guilt in general, and the prejudicial 
effect of the flight instruction in light of these two factors). 
Accordingly, the State's contention that the instruction was 
"prejudice-proofed" is unfounded and does not justify affirmance of 
Madrid's burglary and attempted theft convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and the arguments presented in 
3 In any event, similar guidance from this Court regarding the 
wisdom of including the four, abovementioned factors in a flight 
instruction might avoid future disputes over their propriety and 
prejudicial effect. 
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Madrid's, opening brief, Madrid respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the burglary and attempted theft convictions for 
insufficient evidence. Should the Court find sufficient evidence, 
Madrid requests that his convictions be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial on the basis that the trial court 
committed harmful error in giving a flight instruction that was not 
justified by the evidence. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Madrid respectfully requests oral argument on this matter. 
SUBMITTED this 3A*L day of August, 1999. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY ' 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Flight or attempted flight, if any has been shown, of a person immediately after a 
crime has been committed, or after that person has been accused of a crime, is not enough 
alone to support a guilty verdict. However, you may certainly consider flight along with all 
of the other evidence during your deliberations. 
Keep in mind that there may be legitimate reasons for a person to flee that are 
completely consistent with innocence. A person may flee because he or she feels guilty, but 
that feeling of guilt may stem from something other than the crime with which he or she has 
been charged. The jury must decide whether a person's flight constitutes evidence that the 
person committed the crime charged. 
